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FROM T-SHIRTS TO TEACHING:
MAY PUBLIC SCHOOLS CONSTITUTIONALLY
REGULATE ANTIHOMOSEXUAL SPEECH?
Amanda L. Houle*
In applying the First Amendment in the public school context, courts are
faced with the challenge of balancing the constitutional rights of students
against the discretion of schools to control speech and conduct on school
grounds. This Note focuses on the specific issue of public schools
regulating antihomosexual speech. Evaluating the First Amendment rights
of students expressing antihomosexual sentiment through private and
school-sponsored mediums, this Note ultimately argues for a
comprehensive standard permitting schools to regulate both private and
school-sponsored student speech.
INTRODUCTION
Bright-colored signs on poster board bounced up and down as students
marched in front of Sacramento's Mira Loma High School in April 2006.1
Divided by much more than the slab of pavement 'physically separating
them, students clad in self-made T-shirts chanted at one another from across
the street. 2 Antihomosexual slogans such as "Homosexuality is sin!" and
"The Bible says Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve" were met with calls
to "Stop the Hate!" and chants of "Gay is Okay! ' 3 The students were
demonstrating their support and opposition to the Gay-Straight Alliance's
Day of Silence and the recent suspension of students for wearing antigay T-
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Abner Greene for all of his insight and assistance throughout this process, and Mom, Rachel,
and Sy for their constant support. Special thanks to my father who reminded me daily to
"strive."
I. Deepa Ranganathan et al., Gay Rights Face-off: Day of Silence Spurs Protests,
Suspensions, Sacbee.com, Apr. 27, 2006,
http://dwb.sacbee.com/content/news/story/14248330p-1 5065706c.html#more-images
(displaying pictures of the protest); Stand Up and Speak Out,
http://standupandspeakoutblog.com/2006/04/29/mira-loma-high-school-and-the-day-of-
silence/ (Apr. 29, 2006) (displaying pictures of the protest).
2. Deepa Ranganathan et al., Gay Rights Face-off: Day of Silence Spurs Protests,
Suspensions, Sacramento Bee, Apr. 27, 2006, at Al.
3. Stand Up and Speak Out, supra note 1.
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shirts.4 This scene has become increasingly frequent as the controversy
over antihomosexual speech in public schools continues to spark political,
legal, religious, and social debate across the country.
Responding to this national controversy, courts have addressed the
conflict between a student's First Amendment free speech right and the
power of schools to limit antihomosexual speech. The courts are divided as
to how the speech should be classified, what standard should apply, and
what level of protection should be afforded homosexual students in public
high schools. The courts' divergent opinions have left school authorities
without a clear understanding of when they may permissibly limit
antihomosexual speech on school grounds.
Litigation involving school-imposed limitations on antihomosexual
speech has centered on two distinct scenarios. The first involves the
expression of antihomosexual speech through school-sponsored mediums.
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,5 the U.S. Supreme Court
defined school-sponsored speech as "expressive activities that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school."'6 Under Hazelwood, schools may limit school-
sponsored speech "so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns." 7 The Hazelwood Court, however, did not
explicitly resolve whether schools must remain viewpoint neutral when
limiting school-sponsored speech.8 Division over this viewpoint neutrality
requirement has caused courts to disagree over whether schools may
permissibly limit antihomosexual school-sponsored speech based on the
viewpoint it expresses. 9
The second scenario involves an individual student's expression of
antihomosexual sentiment on school grounds. The speech rights of students
in public schools are governed by Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District.10 Under Tinker, schools may limit student
speech only when that speech threatens to "substantially interfere with the
work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students."'"
Whether a student's rights are impinged upon by degrading hate speech has
yet to be decided by the Supreme Court. Consequently, courts across the
circuits are divided over whether schools may limit antihomosexual student
speech in the interest of protecting the rights of other students. 12
4. High School Students Defend Right to Wear Shirt, SacUnion.com, Apr. 28, 2006,
http://www.sacunion.com/pages/sacramento/articles/8268/.
5. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
6. Id. at 271.
7. Id. at 273.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
11. Id. at 509.
12. See infra Part lI.B.
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This Note posits a standard supporting a school's right to limit
antihomosexual speech in both of these scenarios. Part I examines
traditional First Amendment doctrine. It discusses the Court's historic
protection of a broad free speech principle and resultant disfavor for
government regulation of private speech. Part I then examines the major
exceptions to this highly protective First Amendment standard by
examining the few instances in which the government may regulate speech
based on its subject matter and viewpoint. Part I then discusses the manner
in which these traditional First Amendment doctrines have been adapted
and reformulated in the public school context.
Part II focuses on the divisive issue of how First Amendment doctrine
has been applied to antihomosexual speech in public schools. It examines
conflicting lower court decisions addressing when public schools may limit
school-sponsored and student antihomosexual speech.
Part III resolves the division among the courts by addressing the question
of viewpoint neutrality under Hazelwood and the question of hate speech
under Tinker. This resolution entails a careful application of First
Amendment case law that is consistent with, and sensitive to, the historic
function of schools in American society. Ultimately, this Note advocates
for a cohesive standard permitting schools to limit antihomosexual school-
sponsored and student speech.
I. TRADITIONAL FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Part I discusses the breadth and limitations of the First Amendment both
within and outside of the school context. Part L.A examines the Court's
traditional deference to the First Amendment and its commitment to an
American ideal of free speech that protects an individual's right to express
herself, regardless of how offensive her sentiments might be. Part I.B then
discusses four major instances in which the government is exempt from this
broad First Amendment protection of private expression, and is able to
impose content-based restrictions on speech. Three of these exceptions-
speech in a public forum, obscene speech, and fighting words-are pure
content-based exceptions that allow the government to consider the subject
matter of the speech when imposing regulations. The fourth exception,
government speech, permits the government to move beyond considerations
of subject matter and discriminate on the basis of viewpoint when directly
articulating, or subsidizing, a government message. Finally, Part I.C
examines the manner in which the courts have interpreted and reformulated
these historic First Amendment principles in the public school context.
A. Government Regulation of Private Speech
Despite the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech, the
government may impose reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions on
2008] 2479
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
private speech that are content neutral and serve a significant government
interest. 13  Content-based restrictions that prohibit speech based on the
subject matter expressed, and their most controversial incarnation,
viewpoint-based restrictions, however, have largely been deemed
unconstitutional.' 4 This section outlines the Court's traditional disfavor for
goverunent imposition of these content-based limitations on private speech.
Historically, the Court's disapproval of viewpoint and content-based
restrictions on private speech has been consistent, even when the speech
sought to be expressed is offensive to the public. 15 Indeed, the Court has
noted, "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is
that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."' 16 The Court
has endorsed this broad First Amendment protection of offensive speech
with full recognition of the "verbal tumult [and] discord" that such a policy
might incur.17
B. Exceptions to the First Amendment's Protection of Free Speech
Despite the Court's traditional disfavor for content- and viewpoint-based
limitations on private speech, a number of exceptions have arisen. Part
I.B.1 examines the government's license to impose content-based
limitations on (1) speech uttered in a nonpublic forum, (2) obscene speech,
and (3) speech that constitutes fighting words. Further, Part I.B.2 discusses
the limited manner in which the government may impose viewpoint-based
limitations on speech.
1. Permissible Government Imposition of Content-Based Regulations
a. Nonpublic Forums
Three types of government owned forums exist: (1) traditional public
forums such as streets and parks, (2) designated public forums "opened for
13. Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980).
14. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-29
(1995); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994); John Hart Ely,
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 141-42 (12th prtg. 1980).
15. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (noting twenty years of U.S.
Supreme Court cases upholding an individual's First Amendment right to express
"offensive" and "disagreeable" ideas freely); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 24-26
(1971) (upholding the First Amendment right of an individual to walk down a courthouse
hallway wearing a jacket with the plainly visible expression "Fuck the Draft" inscribed on
it); Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State's Interest in Protecting Children
from Controversial Speech, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 427, 481-82 (2000).
16. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414 (citations omitted); Ross, supra note 15, at 481-82
(discussing Johnson).
17. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25; see also Ely, supra note 14, at 114 ("[The majority in
Cohen] was wise enough to recognize... that what seems offensive to me may not seem
offensive to you, and indeed that much valuable free speech ... very likely was of a sort that
many would have found offensive.").
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use by the public as a place for expressive activity," and (3) nonpublic
forums. 18 The latitude that the government may exercise in limiting the
content and source of discourse within these forums varies according to the
nature of the forum. 19 Within traditional public forums and designated
speech forums, the government may impose content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions, provided that those regulations are narrowly drawn to
achieve a compelling government interest and leave open alternate channels
of communication. 20 Content-based restrictions on speech in traditional
public forums and designated speech forums are presumptively invalid, but
may be permitted in rare circumstances where the government can show
that the regulation is "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that
it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."'21
All remaining government property falls into the category of nonpublic
forums.22 The government may exclude speakers and topics from a
nonpublic forum provided that such restrictions are reasonable in light of
the forum's purpose and are viewpoint neutral. 23 The government may
discriminate on the basis of content to preserve the purpose of a nonpublic
forum, but it may not discriminate against speech that would otherwise fall
within the limits of the forum's purpose based on the view that it
expresses.24 Thus, a school could permit organizations intending to discuss
18. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983); see
also Geoffrey R. Stone et al., The First Amendment 286 (1999); G. Sidney Buchanan, The
Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. 111. L. Rev. 949, 950-51.
19. Steven H. Shiffrin & Jesse H. Choper, The First Amendment: Cases, Comments,
Questions 426 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that "[p]ublic forum doctrine recognizes that
government is obligated to permit some of its property to be used for communicative
purposes without content discrimination, but public forum doctrine also allows other
government property to be restricted to some speakers or for talk about selected subjects");
David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 143, 161 (1992)
(noting that the Perry Court "declared that the level of judicial scrutiny would be determined
by the category of the forum").
20. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); see supra notes 13-14 and
accompanying text. The Ward Court noted,
[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on
the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions "are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information."
491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)).
21. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,461 (1980)).
22. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S 672, 678-79 (1992);
Buchanan, supra note 18, at 950 ("[A] nonpublic forum is simply a governmentally
controlled forum that is not a 'traditional public forum' or 'a public forum created by
government designation .... ').
23. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30
(1995); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985);
Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; see also David L. Kanel, Note, The Role of Viewpoint Neutrality in
Nonpublic Fora Access Restrictions: Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational
Fund Inc., 20 U.S.F. L. Rev. 851, 857-58 (1986).
24. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30; see Kanel, supra note 23, at 859.
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educational issues to use a school facility at the exclusion of groups wishing
to discuss noneducational issues, but it could not exclude a group wishing
to discuss religion while permitting other noneducation-focused groups to
utilize the school premises.25 Collectively, these components essentially
boil down to a reasonableness test that, historically, has not been very
difficult to meet.26
b. Obscene Speech
Outside of nonpublic forums, there are a few narrow exceptions that
permit the government to issue content-based limitations on private speech.
Obscene speech, for example, has been relegated by the Court to a category
of low-value speech producing little social benefit and thus deserving of
little constitutional protection. 27  Accordingly, obscene speech is not
constitutionally protected and is subject to government regulation. 28
In defining the parameters of the "obscene speech" category, modem
courts typically adhere to the guidelines set out in Miller v. California,29
which permitted the regulation of speech that, "taken as a whole, appeal[s]
to the prurient interest in sex, . . . portray[s] sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and ... do[es] not have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value." 30  While this standard necessarily demands an
examination of content, it is divorced from considerations of viewpoint. 3'
25. May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 787 F.2d 1105, 1117-18 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J.).
26. Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 62 (2000); see
Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1713, 1762 (1987) ("[T]he first amendment standards
imposed on the.., nonpublic forum have.., tended to be unduly lax."); Kanel, supra note
23, at 857-58.
27. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 n.12 (1973) (citing Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)); see also Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 ("'It has been well
observed that [obscene] utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality ....' (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942))); Steven G. Gey, The
Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 Mich. L.
Rev. 1564, 1570-71 (1988).
28. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (noting that "obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press"); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 189, 195 (1983) (describing obscene speech as
"perhaps the least protected class of low value expression").
29. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
30. Id. at 24; Gregory K. Laughlin, Sex, Lies, and Library Cards: The First Amendment
Implications of the Use of Software Filters to Control Access to Internet Pornography in
Public Libraries, 51 Drake L. Rev. 213, 241-42 (2003). For a discussion of the courts'
widespread adherence to the Miller v. California standard, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 755 (1982).
31. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84, 388 (1992); see also John
Rothchild, Menacing Speech and the First Amendment: A Functional Approach to
Incitement That Threatens, 8 Tex. J. Women & L. 207, 208-09 & n.1 1(1999).
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Thus, the government may regulate movie theaters showing sexually
oriented material on the basis of a film's content but may not regulate
theaters showing sexually oriented material with a communist message on
the basis of a film's political viewpoint. 32
c. Fighting Words
Like obscene speech and nonpublic forums, "fighting words" are
exempted from broad free speech protection. The Court has removed
fighting words from the cover of the First Amendment because "by their
very utterance [they] inflict injury [and] tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace."' 33 Fighting words are those words that are likely to provoke a
violent reaction when addressed to the average citizen.34 The courts have
significantly narrowed the fighting words doctrine over the years, 35 and it
currently appears to apply only in circumstances where the speech
constitutes a direct and personal insult to an individual. 36 Though an
evaluation of fighting words necessarily entails an examination of their
content, "[t]he government may not regulate [their] use based on hostility-
or favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed." 37
It is debatable whether the courts should expand the definition of fighting
words to include hate speech. Hate speech, though not yet explicitly
defined by the courts, is generally conceived of as hostile and offensive
speech that targets an individual based on his or her race, religion, sexual
orientation, or gender. 38 Proponents of hate speech bans contend that hate
32. Cf Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 69-70 (1976). In Young, the
Supreme Court noted,
[A] line may be drawn on the basis of content without violating the government's
paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication.
For the regulation of the places where sexually explicit films may be exhibited is
unaffected by whatever social, political, or philosophical message a film may be
intended to communicate; whether a motion picture ridicules or characterizes one
point of view or another, the effect of the ordinances is exactly the same.
Id. at 70.
33. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). In Chaplinksy, the Court
upheld a statute that had the purpose of "preserv[ing] the public peace... [by forbidding
such words that] have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to whom,
individually, the remark is addressed." Id. at 573 (citations omitted). Walter Chaplinsky was
convicted of violating the statute by telling a city marshal that the marshal was "a God
damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist." Id. at 569.
34. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
35. See Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?,
1990 Duke L.J. 484, 508.
36. Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 Wash. U. L.Q. 531, 536
(1980); see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) ("No reasonable onlooker would
have regarded Johnson's generalized expression ... as a direct personal insult or an
invitation to exchange fisticuffs."); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
37. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).
38. See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Regulating Hate Speech-Damned if You Do and
Damned if You Don't: Lessons Learned from Comparing the German and U.S. Approaches,
23 B.U. Int'l L.J. 299, 304 (2005) (quoting Samuel Walker, Hate Speech: The History of an
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speech, like fighting words, inflicts harm by its very utterance and thus
should not be protected by the First Amendment. 39
Professor Charles R. Lawrence grounds this argument in the First
Amendment, arguing that hate speech, like fighting words, should not be
protected because it undermines the First Amendment's purpose to "foster
the greatest amount of speech" by muting the voices of its victims.40
Lawrence personifies this point with a personal anecdote from one of his
students who, in response to being called a "faggot," "found himself in a
state of semi-shock,"' 41 unable to muster up a response, conscious of the fact
that any verbal expression would have been "inadequate to counter the
hundreds of years of societal defamation that one word-'faggot'--carried
with it.'' 42 Thus, Lawrence asserts that hate speech, as an instrument of
speech suppression, conflicts with the First Amendment's promotion of
speech and should not be protected.
Taking a somewhat more radical approach, Professor Thane Rosenbaum
justifies hate speech prohibitions by deconstructing the traditional
American idealization of a marketplace of ideas and suggesting that more
speech is not always best.43 Rosenbaum criticizes the First Amendment's
premium on free speech at the cost of psychic harm, and argues in favor of
a legal framework that recognizes the injurious and threatening nature of
spiritually violent speech.44 Rosenbaum envisions a system where spiritual
violence is removed from the cover of the First Amendment and treated in
as legally actionable a manner as its physical manifestation. 45
Despite the contentions of these scholars, the courts have yet to adopt a
conception of the fighting words doctrine that specifically removes hate
American Controversy 8 (1994)); Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 Colum. L.
Rev. 1321, 1349 (1992); Strossen, supra note 35, at 488; Ronald Turner, Hate Speech and
the First Amendment: The Supreme Court's R.A.V. Decision, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 197, 226
(1993) ("Hate speech is more than intolerance; it is direct and open hostility and the
manifestation of racism, sexism, and other 'isms."' (citation omitted)).
39. See Steven L. Winter, Re-Embodying Law, 58 Mercer L. Rev. 869, 892 (2006) ("In
legal debate, [the] conventional metaphorical notion of speech as action is manifested in the
arguments that hate speech is a matter of words that wound or the Chaplinsky notion that
'fighting words' are words which by their very utterance inflict injury.").
40. Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 Duke L.J. 431, 452 ("Assaultive racist speech functions as a preemptive
strike. The racial invective is experienced as a blow, not a proffered idea, and once the blow
is struck, it is unlikely that dialogue will follow."); see Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320, 2337 (1989) ("In
order to avoid receiving hate messages, victims have had to ... curtail their own exercise of
speech rights .... ").
41. Lawrence, supra note 40, at 455.
42. Id.
43. Thane Rosenbaum, The Myth of Moral Justice: Why Our Legal System Fails to Do
What's Right 167-68 (2004).
44. See id. at 276-77. Professor Thane Rosenbaum describes spiritual violence as
consisting of intangible "harms that exist below the radar of physical measurement," such as
"humiliation, indignity, [and] basic neglect." Id. at 34.
45. Id. at 275-80.
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speech from the protection of the First Amendment. The courts have
rejected hate speech codes for two principal reasons. First, ordinances
criminalizing speech that offends, victimizes, or stigmatizes an individual
based on his or her race, religion, gender, or sexual orientation are
unconstitutionally overbroad. 46 Such a regulation impermissibly "sweeps
within its ambit a substantial amount of protected speech along with that
which it may legitimately regulate." 47  Thus, an ordinance permissibly
prohibiting fighting words may not sweep with it an individual's right to
utter speech that causes "hurt feelings, offense, [and] resentment. 48
Even if, however, a hate speech ordinance were drafted so as to only
prohibit racist, sexist, or homophobic speech that otherwise qualified as
fighting words, it would nevertheless be unconstitutional. The Court has
found that the government's power to permissibly regulate fighting words
does not encompass a power to selectively regulate subsets of the fighting
words category.49 Selective regulations impermissibly "impose special
prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored
subjects." 50  Thus, a policy prohibiting fighting words based on "race,
color, creed, religion, or gender" to the exclusion of other subjects, such as
union membership, may be held unconstitutional.
51
2. Permissible Government Imposition of Viewpoint-
Based Limitations on Speech
The Supreme Court carefully articulated the bounds of government
speech in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia52
when it distinguished between direct government speech, government-
46. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 412-14 (1992) (White, J., concurring);
Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 864-66 (E.D. Mich. 1989). The section of Justice
Byron White's concurring opinion in R.A. V. that classified such speech ordinances as
overbroad was joined by Justices Harry Blackmun, Sandra Day O'Connor, and John Paul
Stevens. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 397.
47. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. at 864 (citations omitted).
48. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 414 (White, J., concurring); see Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. at
864. In University of Michigan, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
struck down a university policy that permitted the discipline of any person engaging in
"behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatize[d] or victimize[d] an individual on the basis of
race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital
status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status" by way of "an express or implied threat to an
individual's academic efforts." Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. at 856. The court noted that the
"Supreme Court has consistently held that statutes punishing speech or conduct solely on the
grounds that they are unseemly or offensive are unconstitutionally overbroad." Id. at 864.
49. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 384-85 ("[T]he government may proscribe libel; but it may not
make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the
government.").
50. Id. at 391 (citations omitted); see also Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. at 863 (noting
that antidiscrimination policies cannot prohibit certain speech because of disagreement with
the ideas or messages conveyed); Turner, supra note 38, at 210-14 (discussing the majority
opinion in R.A. V.).
51. R.A.V.,505U.S.at391.
52. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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subsidized speech aimed at articulating a government message, and
government-subsidized speech aimed at facilitating a diversity of
viewpoints. 53 The Court determined that, when the government directly
funds a policy or subsidizes private entities to convey a government
message, "it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its
message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee." 54  Conversely,
when the government "expends funds to encourage a diversity of views,"
viewpoint restrictions are improper. 55 Thus, the government may not
impose viewpoint restrictions on speech when its stated aim is to encourage
a diversity of opinions, but it may impose viewpoint restrictions when it is
directly articulating its own message or subsidizing others to do so.56
The Rosenberger opinion is clear that limitations on direct government
speech need not be viewpoint neutral. However, it creates a somewhat gray
area in the realm of government-subsidized speech, raising the question of
what distinguishes government-subsidized speech offered for public
discourse from government-subsidized speech offered for a government
purpose. Professor Robert C. Post suggests that the Rosenberger decision is
most easily understood in a framework of "managerial domains. '57
"Within managerial domains, the state organizes its resources so as to
achieve specified ends," and, unlike in domains of public discourse, is
permitted to impose viewpoint discriminatory limitations on speech. 58
"Thus the state can regulate speech within public educational institutions so
as to achieve the purposes of education; ... it can regulate speech within
the military so as to preserve the national defense; ... and so forth."'59
C. The Public School Context
Part L.A and Part I.B laid out traditional First Amendment doctrine. This
section examines the Court's interpretation and reformulation of First
Amendment principles in the public school context. Part I.C. 1 explores the
contours of First Amendment protection of private student speech in public
53. Id. at 828-30; see Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 Yale L.J. 151, 155 (1996).
54. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
55. Id. at 834.
56. Greene, supra note 26, at 34 ("[T]he constitutional arguments against regulatory
viewpoint discrimination do not apply to government speech (direct or through funding
conditions) that is viewpoint discriminatory."); see Post, supra note 53, at 154-55 (noting
that the point of the Rosenberger opinion is that, when the state is the speaker, "it may adopt
a determinate content and viewpoint .... But when the state attempts to restrict the
independent contributions of citizens to public discourse, even if those contributions are
subsidized, First Amendment rules prohibiting content and viewpoint discrimination will
apply"). Professor Abner Greene excepts from this general principle instances in which the
government exclusively dominates a speech market. He explains, "If government speech
monopolizes a speech market, then ... it is unconstitutional, both because it disrupts the
knowledge aspect of citizen autonomy and because it converts public discourse from the
voice of many (or at least some) to the voice of one." Greene, supra note 26, at 34.
57. See Post, supra note 53, at 165-67.
58. See id. at 164.
59. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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schools under Tinker. Part I.C.2 discusses curricular speech and the broad
manner in which schools may regulate such speech under the First
Amendment. Finally, Part I.C.3 looks at the somewhat elusive category of
school-sponsored speech under Hazelwood and the extent of its First
Amendment protections. All of the speech standards discussed in this
section differ from those outside of the school context. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has continually noted that "the First Amendment rights of
students in the public schools 'are not automatically coextensive with the
rights of adults in other settings,' ' 60 and must be "applied in light of the
special characteristics of the school environment. '61
1. Private Speech in Public Schools
In Tinker, a school suspended a group of students for wearing
armbands 62 in protest of the Vietnam War. 63 The Supreme Court strongly
criticized the school's attempted suppression of student expression, noting
that "state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism." 64
Accordingly, the Court found that, absent a showing that the speech would
cause a substantial disruption or impinge upon the rights of other students,
limitations on student speech in schools are prohibited.65
2. Curricular Speech in Public Schools
When speaking for itself, a school's speech is characterized as
government speech, and thus the school enjoys broad discretion in choosing
what views and messages to express. 66 In Board of Education v. Pico,67 the
Supreme Court noted that schools have "absolute discretion" in choosing
curriculum. 68 The Court found this discretion necessary to enable schools
60. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)).
61. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
62. Though the armbands did not contain any words, the Court classified the wearing of
the armbands as symbolic speech, which is protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 505-06.
63. Id. at 504; see Susan H. Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling the
Free Speech Clause with Curricular Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 769, 806 (1995).
64. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
65. Id. at 509, 512-13; see Bitensky, supra note 63, at 806-07.
66. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)
("When the University determines the content of the education it provides, it is the
University speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the content of what
is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its
own message."); see supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
67. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
68. Id. at 869. Though the majority limited the school's discretion in choosing what
books to place in the library, the Court explicitly reaffirmed the broad discretion of school
boards making choices involving curriculum. See Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228
F.3d 1003, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000) ("In Pico, the court made clear at the outset that the
respondents in that case did not seek 'to impose limitations upon the school Board's
discretion to prescribe the curricula of the Island Trees schools."' (quoting Pico, 457 U.S. at
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to discharge their duty of inculcating community values in the student
body.69 Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 70 noted,
If... schools may legitimately be used as vehicles for "inculcating
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system," school authorities must have broad discretion to fulfill that
obligation.... How are "fundamental values" to be inculcated except by
having school boards make content-based decisions .... 71
The Pico Court's characterization of educational institutions as sites of
values inculcation has deep roots within American history. Professor David
A. Diamond notes that "[v]alue inculcation, rather than value neutrality, has
been the tradition of public education since the beginning of the American
republic." 72  The responsibility of public educational institutions to
inculcate values in its students dates back to the English common law
doctrine of in loco parentis. 73 The doctrine essentially transfers a portion of
the powers and responsibilities of parents over to schools. 74 The Supreme
Court, though acknowledging that modem schools derive their power from
the State and not just from parents, 75 has continually reinforced the
"custodial and tutelary" duties of schools acting in loco parentis. 76
862)); Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Free
Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 Cornell L. Rev.
62, 81-82 (2002); Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake
ofHazelwood, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 253, 265 (1992).
69. Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 ("We are therefore in full agreement with petitioners that local
school boards must be permitted 'to establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as to
transmit community values,' and that 'there is a legitimate and substantial community
interest in promoting respect for authority and traditional values be they social, moral, or
political."' (quoting Petitioners' Brief at 10, Pico, 457 U.S. 893 (No. 80-2043))); see
Bitensky, supra note 63, at 806.
70. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Justice William H. Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor joined
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger in his dissenting opinion. Pico, 457 U.S. at 885.
71. Pico, 457 U.S. at 889 (Burger, J., dissenting) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68, 77 (1979)). Though the opinion cited is a dissent, both the majority and the dissent
agreed on the broad discretion enjoyed by schools making curriculum choices. See supra
notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
72. David A. Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against
Judicial Intervention, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 477, 499 (1981) (tracing a values-centered educational
system back to the earliest statutes governing American education); see Bitensky, supra note
63, at 774-76; Bruce C. Hafen, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment
Institutions, 1988 Duke L. J. 685, 703-05.
73. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2631 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). "In loco
parentis" translates literally to mean "in the place of a parent." Black's Law Dictionary 803
(8th ed. 2004).
74. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2631; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-
56 (1995); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986).
75. New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985) (noting that "school officials act
as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot
claim the parents' immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment").
76. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656. Vernonia cites Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975),
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), and
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), as examples of Supreme Court cases recognizing
the custodial powers and duties of public schools.
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The in loco parentis view of educational institutions was affirmed in
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,77 when the Court determined that
public schools, acting in their role as values inculcator,78 may limit "the use
of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. ' 79 The Court reasoned
that schools are properly entrusted with the duty to determine the bounds of
appropriate speech in the classroom and school assembly hall.80
Ultimately, the Court concluded that "[t]he First Amendment does not
prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and
lewd speech ... would undermine the school's basic educational
mission."81
The authority of schools to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint when
designing a curriculum is not only grounded in judicial precedent and
educational history, it is further demanded by the current realities of the
American educational system. Professors Martin H. Redish and Kevin
Finnerty speculate on the havoc within the educational system that would
ensue were viewpoint neutrality requirements imposed on a school's choice
of curriculum.82 They note the insufficient time enjoyed by public schools
within the school year to teach all sides to every issue, even those that the
school deems invalid, and the confusion that might result if students were
exposed to such "an indiscriminate form of information transmission. '8 3
Scholarship evaluating what happens to the discretion enjoyed by public
schools speaking for themselves in the context of a nonpublic forum is
somewhat limited. The prevailing view, however, suggests that when
nonpublic forum analysis meets government speech analysis in the context
of public schools, government speech rights must take precedence.
Professor William G. Buss contends that "the usual nonpublic forum test
that prohibits viewpoint discrimination must be modified for contexts
involving curriculum decisions (and in all contexts in which government
legitimately prefers its own speech). ' 84 The Supreme Court alluded to this
77. 478 U.S. 675.
78. Id. at 681 ("'[Plublic education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the
Republic.... It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves
conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the
community and the nation."' (alteration in original) (quoting Charles A. Beard & Mary R.
Beard, New Basic History of the United States 228 (1968))); see S. Elizabeth Wilbom,
Teaching the New Three Rs-Repression, Rights, and Respect: A Primer of Student Speech
Activities, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 119, 131-32 (1995).
79. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
80. Id.; Doni Gewirtzman, "Make Your Own Kind of Music": Queer Student Groups
and the First Amendment, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 1131, 1139 (1998).
81. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683-85; see Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work
of the Schools as Conceptual Development, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 1269, 1283 (1991).
82. Redish & Finnerty, supra note 68, at 98.
83. Id.; see also Diamond, supra note 72, at 493 n.86.
84. William G. Buss, Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech: Communicating the
Curriculum, 2 J. Gender Race & Just. 213, 255 (1999).
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view in Rosenberger85 when noting that "[a] holding that [a public
educational institution] may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of
private persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the [public
institution's] own speech, which is controlled by different principles. '8 6
The principle that government speech rights take precedence was
demonstrated in Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School District,87 where a
teacher at a public high school sued the school district after it prevented him
from placing materials containing antihomosexual viewpoints on a school
bulletin board designated for information pertaining to the school's Gay and
Lesbian Awareness Month. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit classified the bulletin board as government speech in a nonpublic
forum and held that, "when a public high school is the speaker, its control
of its own speech is not subject to the constraints of constitutional
safeguards and forum analysis."8 8 Thus, consistent with the parameters of
government speech articulated in Rosenberger, the school ensured that its
message of tolerance was communicated clearly by limiting the
antihomosexual viewpoints of one of its representatives. 89
3. School-Sponsored Speech in Public Schools
In 1988, the Supreme Court articulated a new, and highly nuanced,
standard wedged somewhere in between the broad protection of student
speech in Tinker and the broad protection of government speech in Pico. In
Hazelwood,90 the Court first addressed the unique doctrinal challenges in
classifying student speech that, more than simply occurring on school
grounds, "might reasonably [be] perceive[d] [as] bear[ing] the imprimatur
of the school." 91 In Hazelwood, the Court reviewed a school principal's
elimination of two pages of a student newspaper produced in the course of a
journalism class. The principal deemed the material in question to be an
85. 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that the University of Virginia violated the First
Amendment by refusing to fund the printing of a student newspaper because of the
newspaper's religious viewpoint).
86. Id. at 834; see supra notes 52-59.
87. 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000).
88. Id. at 1013.
89. Id. at 1014 ("An arm of local government-such as a school board-may decide not
only to talk about gay and lesbian awareness and tolerance in general, but also to advocate
such tolerance if it so decides, and restrict the contrary speech of one of its
representatives.").
90. 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988).
91. Id. at 271. See Fleming v. Jefferson County School District for further discussion of
what constitutes bearing the school's imprimatur. 298 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2002). The
Fleming court noted the following:
The imprimatur concept covers speech that is so closely connected to the school
that it appears the school is somehow sponsoring the speech. Expressive activities
that do not bear the imprimatur of the school could include a variety of activities
conducted by outside groups that take place on school facilities after-school, such
as club meetings.
Id. (citing Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001)).
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invasion of certain students' right to privacy and inappropriate for the
school's younger students.92
The Hazelwood Court first addressed the question of whether the school
had created a public forum. 93 The Court found that because the school had
not intentionally opened up a forum for "'indiscriminate use"' by the
students or public generally, no public forum had been created.94 The
forum had remained reserved for the intended purpose of creating "a
supervised learning experience for journalism students," 95  and
consequently, as is the case with traditional nonpublic forums,96 the school
was entitled to regulate its content in a reasonable manner. 97
The Court next addressed whether the speech in question was
appropriately governed by Tinker. The Court distinguished student speech
under Tinker that incidentally happens to occur on school grounds from
speech that the school promotes, and consequently framed a new category
of "school-sponsored" speech.98 The Court ruled that school-sponsored
speech, when "supervised by faculty members and designed to impart
particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences," 99
could "fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum." 100 Relying
on a school's traditional discretion to regulate curricular speech, the Court
ruled that the First Amendment does not bar educators from editing the
style and content of a student's school-sponsored speech, provided that their
actions are "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."101
II. THE DEBATE: THE COURTS DIVIDE OVER WHAT TYPES OF
ANTIHOMOSEXUAL EXPRESSIONS PUBLIC SCHOOLS MAY REGULATE
Part L.A and Part I.B of this Note laid out the underpinnings of First
Amendment jurisprudence and the Supreme Court's historical protection of
a broad free speech principle. Part I.C then narrowed this First Amendment
92. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262-64; see Bitensky, supra note 63, at 816; R. George
Wright, School-Sponsored Speech and the Surprising Case for Viewpoint-Based
Regulations, 31 S. Ill. U. L.J. 175, 178-79 (2007).
93. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267; Wright, supra note 92, at 179-80.
94. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)); Wright, supra note 92, at 181.
95. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270.
96. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
97. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270; see supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
98. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71; see supra note 92, at 184. Susan Bitensky notes
that the Hazelwood Court
reasoned that the question before it was not whether the Free Speech Clause
requires public schools to tolerate student speech unrelated to the curriculum, as in
Tinker, but, rather, whether the clause requires schools to tolerate student speech
that is part of the curriculum and thereby give the impression that the school
endorses the contents of such speech.
Bitensky, supra note 63, at 816.
99. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
100. Id.; see Bitensky, supra note 63, at 816-17.
101. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273; see Bitensky, supra note 63, at 816-17.
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study to the public school context by examining the three major categories
of speech in public schools and their corresponding levels of constitutional
protection. Part II further focuses this inquiry by isolating the narrow
category of antihomosexual speech and examining the extent of its First
Amendment protection in public schools.
A comprehensive understanding of when and the extent to which the
First Amendment protects antihomosexual speech in public schools requires
a careful examination of the major categories of school speech introduced
in Part I, and the distinct legal standards that the courts have imposed on
each. This endeavor is complicated, however, by the courts' division over
how to treat antihomosexual speech within these different categories.
Although the courts have affirmed the discretion of schools to regulate
antihomosexual curricular speech, 10 2 they have divided sharply over
whether schools may regulate antihomosexual student expression offered
through private and school-sponsored mediums. 103
Part II explores this judicial debate over how courts should treat
antihomosexual student expression within the traditional categories of
school speech. Part II.A. 1 examines the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan's conclusion in Hansen v. Ann Arbor Public
Schools1 04 that antihomosexual speech presented through school-sponsored
channels may not be regulated based on the viewpoint that it expresses.
The controversy and criticism surrounding this decision has undermined its
precedential strength, and is discussed fully in Part II.A.2. Part II.B then
explores the differing court opinions on whether schools may regulate
antihomosexual student speech in the interest of promoting tolerance and
protecting the rights of homosexual students.
A. The Debate over Whether Public Schools May Regulate
Antihomosexual School-Sponsored Speech
This section examines the debate over whether Hazelwood sanctions
limitations on school-sponsored antihomosexual speech. The central
question is whether Hazelwood requires schools to remain viewpoint
102. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently extended the widely
accepted authority of public schools to regulate curricular speech into the realm of tolerance-
based discussions of homosexuality. In Parker v. Hurley, parents of elementary school
children claimed that a curriculum containing tolerance-based messages regarding
homosexuals and homosexual couples had violated their free exercise right. No. 07-1528,
2008 WL 250375, at *1 (lst Cir. Jan. 31, 2008). Although the parents wished their children
to be exempt from these lessons, they conceded that "the school system has a legitimate
secular interest in seeking to eradicate bias against same-gender couples and to ensure the
safety of all public school students." Id. at * 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court
reinforced this idea by noting the "well recognized" proposition that, "while parents can
choose between public and private schools, they do not have a constitutional right to 'direct
how a public school teaches their child."' Id. at * 10 (quoting Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch.
Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395 (6th Cir. 2005)).
103. See supra notes 62-65, 90-101 and accompanying text.
104. 293 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
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neutral when regulating speech that might reasonably be perceived as
bearing the school's imprimatur. Part II.A.1 looks at the recent Hansen
decision that struck down a school's regulation of antihomosexual speech
pursuant to a viewpoint neutrality requirement under Hazelwood. Part
II.A.2 then examines the Hansen court's reliance on a viewpoint neutrality
requirement by exploring the arguments of courts and theorists on both
sides of the debate.
1. Hansen v. Ann Arbor Public Schools
The Eastern District of Michigan addressed whether schools may
regulate antihomosexual school-sponsored speech in Hansen.10 5  Ann
Arbor High School (Ann Arbor) holds an annual Diversity Week. 106 All
events scheduled during Diversity Week are organized by student groups
and approved by the principal of the school. 10 7 In 2002, Ann Arbor
approved the addition of a panel discussion entitled "Religion and
Homosexuality" to Diversity Week. 108 The panel consisted of six "pro-
homosexual adult clergy and religious leaders." 10 9  Ann Arbor's Gay-
Straight Alliance club and its supervising faculty, who all intended the
panel to convey a welcoming and affirming message regarding
homosexuality, primarily organized the panel." 0
Elizabeth "Betsy" Hansen, a senior at Ann Arbor, and a member of the
extracurricular club Pioneers for Christ, III attempted to elect a religious
clergy member representative of her viewpoint to the panel, but was
denied."12 Hansen was, however, invited to speak at a general assembly
during Diversity Week. 1 3 Hansen wrote a speech that included comments
such as "I can't accept religious and sexual ideas or actions that are wrong"
in reference to homosexuality. 114 Ann Arbor administrators found portions
of Hansen's speech objectionable "because [they] targeted...
105. Id. at 782-83.
106. Id. at 784; see George W. Dent, Jr., Civil Rights for Whom?: Gay Rights Versus
Religious Freedom, 95 Ky. L.J. 553, 601 (2007).
107. Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 784.
108. Id. at 784-85; see Ralph D. Mawdsley, Access to Public School Facilities for
Religious Expression by Students, Student Groups and Community Organizations:
Extending the Reach of the Free Speech Clause, 2004 BYU Educ. & L.J. 269, 295.
109. Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 790-91.
110. Id. at 785-86; see Dent, supra note 106, at 601; Mawdsley, supra note 108, at 295
(noting that Ann Arbor High School (Ann Arbor) "permitted the school's Gay-Straight
Alliance to organize a panel on Homosexuality and Religion that included local clergy with
views favorable to homosexuality").
111. Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 783.
112. Id. at 790; see Mawdsley, supra note 108, at 295; Lisa Shaw Roy, Inculcation, Bias,
and Viewpoint Discrimination in Public Schools, 32 Pepp. L. Rev. 647, 669 (2005).
113. Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 791; see Mawdsley, supra note 108, at 295.
114. Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 792; Dent, supra note 106, at 601.
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homosexuals."1 5 Ann Arbor suggested that Hansen make changes, and she
did.]1 6
Subsequently, Hansen brought suit against Ann Arbor for violation of her
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 1 7  In addressing the First
Amendment claim, the Hansen court distinguished between the
government's own direct speech and school-sponsored speech. The court
defined direct school speech, or government speech, as taking place
"[w]hen the government itself is the speaker."' 118 The court found that in
this situation, the government "may make viewpoint-based choices and
choose what to say and what not to say."'1 19 As to school-sponsored speech,
the court recognized Hazelwood as the prevailing standard, 120 and found
that a school may "exercise editorial control so long as its actions in doing
so 'are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns"' and are
viewpoint neutral. 121 Because the Diversity Week events at issue were
"specifically and particularly planned by student groups with their faculty
advisors and were approved by school administration," the court found the
speech on the panel and at the general assembly to fall under the final
category, and thus to be governed by Hazelwood. 122
115. Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 792; see Dent, supra note 106, at 601.
116. Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 792; see Roy, supra note 112, at 669-70.
117. Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 792; see Mawdsley, supra note 108, at 295.
118. Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 793.
119. Id. at 793; see Dent, supra note 106, at 601.
120. Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 793.
121. Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)).
122. Id. at 794; Holning Lau, Pluralism: A Principle for Children's Rights, 42 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev., 317, 366 (2007). If the panel, which had the explicit aim of
communicating a welcoming message regarding homosexuality, had been directly organized
by the school administration rather than students, it would have qualified as government
speech aimed at articulating a government message. See supra notes 52-59 and
accompanying text. In this situation, the school could, without question, legitimately
discriminate based on viewpoint. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text. Citing
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), the
Hansen court recognized that, had the Diversity Week events been classified as government
speech, the school could have made "viewpoint-based choices and [chosen] what to say and
what not to say." Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 793.
Removing the Hansen court's classification of the speech in question as school sponsored,
however, raises further issues. The Hansen court did not distinguish between Diversity
Week's panel discussion and the general assembly. Arguably however, if the two forums are
removed from the broad cover of school-sponsored speech, they may be categorized under
distinct Rosenberger standards. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. While the
panel discussion had the explicit aim of sponsoring viewpoints "welcoming" to
homosexuality, the general assembly's stated aim was to kick off Diversity Week with
student speeches entitled "what diversity means to me." Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 791.
The general assembly seems most appropriately categorized as an instance of the
government expending funds to encourage a diversity of views. See supra notes 52-56 and
accompanying text. Traditionally, the government is not permitted to discriminate based on
viewpoint in such a situation. See id. Under a pure Rosenberger analysis, then, the school's
action would have been unconstitutional. As Part III of this Note demonstrates, however, the
unique circumstances of the school environment may have saved Ann Arbor from a First
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The Hansen court rejected all of Ann Arbor's asserted pedagogical
concerns as pretext for the school's disagreement with Hansen's
viewpoint. 123 Citing cases from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the court asserted that "under Hazelwood, a
school does not have a completely unfettered right to restrict speech. A
school's restrictions on speech reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns must still be viewpoint-neutral."'1 24 Consequently, Ann Arbor was
found to have violated Hazelwood and impermissibly limited school-
sponsored speech on the basis of viewpoint. 125
2. Challenging the Premises of Hansen
The Hansen decision relies on the idea that limitations on school-
sponsored speech made under Hazelwood must be viewpoint neutral;
however, there is much contention among the circuits and scholars as to
whether that is true. 126 Even within Hansen's Sixth Circuit, the lower
courts have yet to wholly endorse a viewpoint neutrality requirement under
Hazelwood. Indeed, a recent case from the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky involving a public school's prohibition of
antihomosexual speech noted the "splintered jurisprudence" on this
issue. 127
Scholars and courts arguing in favor of a viewpoint neutrality
requirement under Hazelwood point to the Court's traditional language of
viewpoint neutrality in nonpublic forum analysis. The principal cases relied
upon by the Hazelwood Court, Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund Inc.128 and Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n,129 noted that restrictions on nonpublic forums must be
Amendment violation and sanctioned the school district's limitation on an individual
student's antihomosexual speech. See infra Part III.B.
123. Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 800; see Mawdsley, supra note 108, at 295.
124. Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 797; see Dent, supra note 106, at 601; Mawdsley, supra
note 108, at 296.
125. Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 803; Mawdsley, supra note 108, at 295.
126. See Busch v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., No. 05-CV-2094, 2007 WL 1589507, at
*6, 8 (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2007); Morrison ex rel. v. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. Supp. 2d 937, 942
n.3 (E.D. Ky. 2006), rev'd on other grounds, 507 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Peck ex
rel. v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 632 n.9 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting the
disagreement among the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits over whether educators can make "viewpoint-based decisions about
school-sponsored speech"); Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1542 (7th
Cir. 1996). See generally Ralph D. Mawdsley, Solicitation of Personal Messages for Display
on Public School Premises: What Are the First Amendment Considerations?, 213 Educ.
Law Rep. 909 (2006) (discussing the disagreement among courts as to a viewpoint neutrality
requirement under Hazelwood).
127. Morrison, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 942 n.3.
128. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
129. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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reasonable in light of the forum's purpose and viewpoint neutral. 130 This
has led courts in the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits to doubt
that the Supreme Court would change the course of First Amendment
public forum analysis in a silent and ambiguous manner. 131 Thus, these
courts conclude that Hazelwood, consistent with the Court's traditional
nonpublic forum analysis, requires that schools regulate school-sponsored
speech in a viewpoint neutral manner that is reasonable in light of the
forum's purpose. 1
32
Scholars who argue against Hansen's reading of Hazelwood have taken
two avenues of analysis: strict textual interpretation and a pragmatic
analysis of the consequences of a viewpoint neutral requirement. Relying
on the plain language of the opinion, courts and scholars note that
Hazelwood at no point explicitly articulates a requirement of viewpoint
neutrality. 133
Beyond this plain language analysis of Hazelwood, scholars have refuted
a viewpoint neutrality requirement by pointing to its infeasibility. The
difficulties inherent in navigating the fine and gray line between speech in a
nonpublic forum that the school sponsors, and official speech by the school,
have been highlighted as reason enough to reject disparate standards. 134
Moreover, scholars have criticized a viewpoint neutrality requirement
under Hazelwood for its unlikely success as a regulatory measure. Some
130. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; Perry, 460 U.S. at 49; see supra notes 18-26 and
accompanying text. Whether the Court has, in practice, consistently applied a viewpoint
neutrality requirement in public forum analysis is debatable. See Erwin Chemerinsky,
Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme
Court's Application, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 49, 59 (2000); Greene, supra note 26, at 32-33;
Janna J. Annest, Note & Comment, Only the News That 's Fit to Print: The Effect of
Hazelwood on the First Amendment Viewpoint-Neutrality Requirement in Public School-
Sponsored Forums, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 1227, 1233 (2002) ("The court has ... obscured the
distinction between content and viewpoint by declining to fully explain its characterization
of potentially viewpoint-based laws as viewpoint-neutral."); see, e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 65
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority improperly classified a regulation
awarding one union sole access to an interschool mail system as viewpoint neutral when, in
fact, the policy repressed speech based on its point of view). Nevertheless, courts that have
interpreted Hazelwood as imposing a viewpoint neutrality requirement on nonpublic forum
regulations have taken the Perry and Cornelius Courts at their word. See infra note 131 and
accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Peck, 426 F.3d at 632-33; Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark
County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991); Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314,
1319 n.7, 1325 (11 th Cir. 1989) ("Although the Supreme Court did not discuss viewpoint
neutrality in Hazelwood, there is no indication that the Court intended to drastically re-write
First Amendment law. ); Dean v. Utica Cmty. Schs., 345 F. Supp. 2d 799, 813 (E.D.
Mich. 2004).
132. Salomone, supra note 68, at 316; see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
133. Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (1st Cir. 1993); Wright, supra note 92, at 182-83
("[W]hen the Hazelwood Court reiterates its non-public forum finding, it again omits the
usual viewpoint-neutrality requirement, even when citing language in Perry that does impose
such a viewpoint-neutrality requirement." (footnotes omitted)); see also supra notes 22-26.
134. Wright, supra note 92, at 198 (noting that we should "be reluctant to try to impose
radically different free speech tests on such only hazily distinguishable categories").
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scholars have predicted that, whether or not lip service is paid to a
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination, no such requirement will operate
in reality. 135 Professor R. George Wright notes that the examples listed by
the Hazelwood Court as permissibly regulated school-sponsored speech,
such as speech that appears to advocate "'conduct otherwise inconsistent
with the shared values of a civilized order,"' are unlikely to be regulated on
the basis of anything but viewpoint.136
B. The Debate over Whether Public Schools May Regulate
Antihomosexual Student Speech
The previous section discussed the competing opinions as to whether
antihomosexual school-sponsored speech may be constitutionally regulated
by public schools. This section moves on to examine the debate over
whether schools may regulate student speech that, rather than being
endorsed by the school, simply happens to occur on school grounds. Part
I.B.1 discusses the Ninth Circuit's finding that, under Tinker, schools may
regulate antihomosexual student speech in the interest of protecting the
rights of homosexual students to be secure and free from harassment.
Conversely, Part II.B.2 examines the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio's contention that, under Tinker, student speech may not be
regulated purely based on the fact that it expresses antihomosexual
sentiment.
1. Harper v. Poway Unified School District
In Harper v. Poway Unified School District,137 the Ninth Circuit weighed
in on the debate over whether schools may limit antihomosexual student
speech. Plaintiff Tyler Chase Harper attended Poway High School
(Poway). 138  In 2004, Poway's extracurricular organization, the Gay-
Straight Alliance, held a Day of Silence with the permission of Poway. 139
The Day of Silence aimed to encourage tolerance, especially tolerance of
homosexuals.140
135. Id. at 186-87. For further discussion of this approach see Martin H. Redish & Kevin
Finnerty's analysis of the pragmatist's voice in the debate over when values inculcation
should be permitted in public schools. Redish & Finnerty, supra note 68, at 95.
136. Wright, supra note 92, at 186 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 272 (1988)); see Roy, supra note 112, at 668 (suggesting that schools might offer
"sham" justifications for restricting school-sponsored speech which "conceal[] a desire to
suppress a political, religious or racial viewpoint"); see also supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
137. 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007).
138. Id. at 1171.
139. Id.; see Kevin C. McDowell, The Paradox of Inclusion by Exclusion: The
Accommodation of Religion in the Public Schools, 40 Ind. L. Rev. 499, 502 (2007).
140. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1171; Richard Fossey et al., Harper v. Poway Unified School
District: Schools Can Ban Demeaning Speech Toward Vulnerable Students Without
Offending the First Amendment, 211 Educ. Law Rep. 559, 561 (2006).
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On the 2004 Day of Silence, plaintiff Harper wore a T-shirt that read "I
Will Not Accept What God Has Condemned" and "Homosexuality Is
Shameful-Romans 1:27."141 On the following day, Harper wore a T-shirt
that read "Be Ashamed, Our School Embraced What God Has Condemned"
on the front, and "Homosexuality Is Shameful. Romans 1:27" on the
back. 142  The school administration told Harper that his shirt was
"inflammatory,... and that it created a negative and hostile working
environment for others."'143 Harper refused to remove his shirt and
consequently he was instructed to remain in the school's front office, away
from other students, for the remainder of the day. 144
Subsequently, Harper brought suit for violation of his First Amendment
rights. 145 The court relied on the authority of schools under Tinker to
curtail a student's freedom of speech when that speech "'impinge[s] upon
the rights of other students.' 1 46 The court found that Tinker's protection of
the rights of students to be secure involves freedom from physical assault
and "freedom from... psychological attacks that cause young people to
question their self-worth and their rightful place in society."' 147 Citing
extensive sociological research on the topic, 148 the court found that
psychological attacks on homosexual students are "harmful not only to the
students' health and welfare, but also to their educational performance and
their ultimate potential for success in life."'149 Consequently, the court
found that the school was justified in prohibiting Harper from displaying his
T-shirt "on the ground that his conduct was injurious to gay and lesbian
students and interfered with their right to learn" and be let alone. 150
Sensitive to the importance of a student's fundamental right to freedom of
141. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1171; see McDowell, supra note 139, at 502.
142. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1171; Fossey et al., supra note 140, at 561.
143. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1172 (internal quotation marks omitted); see McDowell, supra
note 139, at 502.
144. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1172; see McDowell, supra note 139, at 502.
145. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1173; see McDowell, supra note 139, at 502.
146. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1177 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)); Paul M. Smith et al., Courtside: Student Speech Rights, Comm.
Law., Fall 2006, at 23, 23-24 (2006).
147. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178; Fossey et al., supra note 140, at 563.
148. See, e.g., Michael Bochenek & A. Widney Brown, Human Rights Watch, Hatred in
the Hallways: Violence and Discrimination Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and
Transgender Students in U.S. Schools (2001),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/uslgbt/toc.htm; Kelli Kristine Armstrong, The Silent
Minority Within a Minority: Focusing on the Needs of Gay Youth in Our Public Schools, 24
Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 67 (1994); Nicolyn Harris & Maurice R. Dyson, Safe Rules or Gays'
Schools? The Dilemma of Sexual Orientation Segregation in Public Education, 7 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 183 (2004); Susanne M. Stronski Huwiler & Gary Remafedi, Adolescent
Homosexuality, 33 Rev. Jur. U.I.P.R. 151 (1999); Amy Lovell, "Other Students Used to Say,
'Look at the Dykes'": Protecting Students from Peer Sexual Orientation Harassment, 86
Cal. L. Rev. 617 (1998); Thomas A. Mayes, Confronting Same-Sex, Student-to-Student
Sexual Harassment: Recommendations for Educators and Policy Makers, 29 Fordham Urb.
L.J. 641 (2001).
149. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1179; Smith et al., supra note 146, at 24.
150. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1180; Smith et al., supra note 146, at 24.
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speech and expression, the court limited its holding "to instances of
derogatory and injurious remarks directed at students' minority status such
as race, religion, and sexual orientation." 151
Although the Harper court rooted its analysis in the Tinker standard, it
did not confine its discussion to situations where limitations on student
speech are justified by resulting impingements on the rights of other
students. Rather, the court provided additional support for the school's
actions by invoking the traditional role of educational institutions as sites of
values inculcation.1 52  It reasoned that a school's educational mission
entails the "inculcation of 'fundamental values of habits and manners of
civility essential to a democratic society.""' 153 Consequently, the court
found that schools may promote conversations "of tolerance, equality and
democracy without being required to provide equal time for student or other
speech espousing intolerance, bigotry or hatred."' 154 Ultimately, a school
may foster conversations of tolerance without permitting "quid pro quo...
hateful and injurious speech that runs counter to [its] mission." 155
The Harper decision was vacated as the request for a preliminary
injunction became moot when the plaintiff graduated; 156 however, the
court's rationale has been used as persuasive precedent. Most notably, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie
School District No. 204 Board of Education157 recently adopted the Harper
standard in a case with nearly identical facts.158
2. Nixon v. Northern Local School District Board of Education
Contrary to the Harper court's interpretation of Tinker, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio has held that public schools may not
151. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1183; see Dent, supra note 106, at 599.
152. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1185; see Dent, supra note 106, at 600; supra notes 69-81 and
accompanying text.
153. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1185 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 681 (1986)); see Dent, supra note 106, at 600.
154. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1185.
155. Id. at 1186.
156. Recent Cases, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1691, 1694 (2007).
157. No. 07 C 1586, 2007 WL 1141597 (N.D. I11. Apr. 17, 2007).
158. In Zamecnik, defendant Indian Prairie School District (Indian Prairie) permitted the
Gay-Straight Alliance student organization to organize a Day of Silence, which was
"intended to protest anti-gay discrimination and [to] express support for tolerance of gays."
Id. at *1. The day following the 2006 Day of Silence, plaintiff Heidi Zamecnik, a high
school senior at Indian Prairie, wore a T-shirt with the words "Be Happy, Not Gay"
inscribed on the back. Id. at *2. The dean of students at Indian Prairie advised Zamecnik
that her shirt had offended other students and that she must cross off the words "Not Gay"
from her T-shirt. Id. Zamecnik complied and went back to class. Id. Zamecnik subsequently
moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Indian Prairie from preventing her from
expressing her antihomosexual views. Id. at * 1. Applying Harper, the court found Indian
Prairie's limitation on student speech to be justified both by the school's pedagogical interest
in promoting tolerance among students, and by its responsibility to protect gay students from
being harmed physically and psychologically. Id. at *8-11.
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regulate antihomosexual speech based on the viewpoint that it expresses. In
Nixon v. Northern Local School District Board of Education,159 an eighth-
grade student sought to wear a T-shirt with the words "Homosexuality is a
sin! Islam is a lie! Abortion is mrder! Some issues are just black and
white!" inscribed on the back.160 The principal and assistant principal
informed the student and the student's parents that he could not return to
class if he did not remove the shirt or turn it inside out.16 1 The student
refused, and his parents took him out of school for the day. 162
Subsequently, the student and his parents filed suit seeking a preliminary
injunction that would allow the student to wear his T-shirt. 163
In evaluating the plaintiffs claim, the court sought to determine the
"extent of a student's constitutional right to freely express himself on
school grounds."' 64 The court rejected the defendant's suggestion that the
school district was permitted under Fraser to limit the student's freedom to
wear his T-shirt. 165 The court reasoned that the T-shirt did not qualify as
plainly offensive speech, and that political expressions such as the one at
issue were more appropriately analyzed under Tinker. 166
The Nixon court focused on Tinker's condition that limitations on student
speech must be based on more than "'a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.I' 1 67
The court found that the school had failed to offer "evidence of any history
of violence or disorder in the school or any other circumstances that would
justify a reasonable likelihood of disruption, beyond the mere fact that there
are groups of students and/or staff that could likely find the shirt's message
offensive." 168 The court further rejected the suggestion that the school's
action might have been sanctioned under Tinker due to the T-shirt's
159. 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
160. Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 967; see Lau, supra note 122, at 366.
161. Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 967; see Brett Thompson, Comment, Student Speech
Rights in the Modern Era, 57 Mercer L. Rev. 857, 874 (2006) (noting that "school officials
considered the t-shirt to be offensive and inappropriate, and prohibited Nixon from wearing
it at school").
162. Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 967-68.
163. Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 968; see Thompson, supra note 161, at 874.
164. Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 969.
165. Id. at 971; see Thompson, supra note 161, at 874. In Bethel School District No. 403
v. Fraser, the Supreme Court found that schools may abridge a student's First Amendment
right in the interest of "prohibit[ing] the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public
discourse." 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). For a full discussion of the Fraser decision, see supra
notes 77-81.
166. Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 971. The Nixon court found that Fraser was more
concerned with the offensive manner in which speech can be conveyed, as opposed to the
content of that speech, and that Tinker was more concerned with the content of potentially
offensive political views. Id. at 971; see Thompson, supra note 161, at 874. But see Fraser,
478 U.S. at 683 (1986) ("By glorifying male sexuality, and in its verbal content, the speech
was acutely insulting to teenage girl students.").
167. Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 974 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)); see Thompson, supra note 161, at 875.
168. Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 973; see Thompson, supra note 161, at 875.
2500 [Vol. 76
REGULA TING ANTIHOMOSEXUAL SPEECH
capacity to invade the rights of other students. 169 The court explained, "Just
as in Tinker, there is no evidence [here] that [the student's] silent, passive
expression of opinion interfered with the work of [the school] or collided
with the rights of other students to be let alone."170
Scholarship reacting to the Harper-Nixon disagreement has focused on
Harper's reliance on, and Nixon's rejection of, a student's right to be free
not only from physical assault, but also from psychological harm.
Professors Richard Fossey, Todd A. DeMitchell, and Robert LeBlanc argue
that Harper's concern for the psychological vulnerability of students to
demeaning speech misapplies Tinker and deviates from American
constitutional norms. 171 Under this view, Tinker left no room for a decision
like Harper when it determined that "suppressing a student's speech in the
school environment required something more than 'a mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness.""' 172 These professors find that, beyond
its misapplication of Tinker, Harper stands as an affront to our nation's
historical commitment to a freedom of speech that absorbs the risk of
provoking debate, disturbance, and personal offense. 173  Rejecting a
solution built on speech restrictions, this approach ultimately advocates for
an expansion of debate and dialogue on controversial topics such as
homosexuality. 174
On the other side of the debate, Professor Holning Lau criticizes Nixon
for its failure to appreciate the psychological harm that hate speech inflicts
on the identity development of schoolchildren. 175 Lau argues that children
engaged in identity development are exceptionally vulnerable, and thus
require a unique free speech standard that regulates hate speech among
children in schools. 176 In Lau's view, Harper's legitimization of school
policies that restrict a student's ability to inflict cognizable identity harms
on other students has roots as far back as Brown v. Board of Education,177
when the Supreme Court first "invoked identity interests to justify special
169. Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 974; see Thompson, supra note 161, at 875.
170. Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 974; see Lau, supra note 122, at 368 n.328.
171. Fossey et al., supra note 140, at 570-72; see also Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schs.,
293 F. Supp. 2d 780, 802 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (rejecting the idea that "gays would be
threatened or be made less 'safe' by allowing the expression of an opposing viewpoint").
172. Fossey et al., supra note 140, at 570 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)).
173. Fossey et al., supra note 140, at 570-71; see also Redish & Finnerty, supra note 68,
at 87 (criticizing educational systems that seek to inculcate values within and outside the
curriculum as failing to prepare individuals for autonomous thought processes that are
essential to democratic society).
174. Fossey et al., supra note 140, at 572 ("When it comes to controversial topics like the
one taken up in Harper, public schools and their students would be better served by more
speech rather than less.").
175. Lau, supra note 122, at 368.
176. Id. at 327, 338-40, 365.
177. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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rights for children."' 178 Ultimately, Lau concludes that Harper properly
found Tinker's protection of a student's rights to "'be secure and to be let
alone"' 179 to encompass a right to develop his or her identity freely.18 0
Lau's argument for protecting a student's identity development has been
highlighted as uniquely applicable to homosexual students. Many legal,
educational, and sociological scholars have noted the toxicity of modem
public schools for homosexual students. The effects of verbal abuse,
physical violence, and social ostracization on homosexual students have
been linked to higher rates of depression, suicide, and substance abuse. 181
178. Lau, supra note 122, at 361. This reading of Brown is consistent with Professor
Charles Lawrence's interpretation. See Lawrence, supra note 40, at 462. Lawrence notes
that Brown "speaks directly to [a] psychic injury inflicted by racist speech," analogous to
injuries "for which the law commonly provides, and even requires, redress." Id. at 462.
Beyond finding this jurisprudence of distinct First Amendment rights for children to be
rooted in Supreme Court precedent, Professor Lau grounds the discretionary power of
schools to limit hate speech in the catalog of other harms from which schools have the
discretion to protect their students. Lau, supra note 122, at 367. Lau notes the discretion of
schools to determine what forms of search and seizure are unreasonable and what student
speech is likely to lead to substantial disruption. Id.
179. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
180. Lau, supra note 122, at 367; see Diamond, supra note 72, at 504-05 (discussing the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's accurate recognition, in Trachman v. Ankler,
440 F.2d 803, 807 (2d Cir. 1971), that Tinker protects against psychological harm). But see
Roy, supra note 112, at 667. Like Lau, Lisa Shaw Roy asserts that functionally offensive
speech threatens the value and identity development of students. Id. Believing, however,
that a student marketplace of ideas will control for the effects of functionally offensive
student speech, Roy limits permissible regulation of this speech to instances when the speech
is school sponsored. Id. at 667, 670.
181. Beth Reis, Safe Schs. Coal. of Wash. State, Understanding Anti-Gay Harassment
and Violence in Schools 13-16 (1999), available at
http://www.safeschoolscoalition.org/theydontevenknowme.pdf; James Allon Garland,
Breaking the Enigma Code: Why the Law Has Failed to Recognize Sex as Expressive
Conduct Under the First Amendment, and Why Sex Between Men Proves That It Should, 12
Law & Sexuality Rev. 159, 245 & n.417 (2003) (citing American Medical Association and
American Psychological Association studies and fact sheets supporting the contention that
high rates of depression, suicide, and substance abuse in homosexuals are a reaction to
prejudices waged against them); Tracie L. Hammelman, Gay and Lesbian Youth:
Contributing Factors to Serious Attempts or Considerations of Suicide, 2(1) J. Gay &
Lesbian Psychotherapy, 77, 77-89 (1993) (noting that rates of suicide are two to three times
more severe in gay students than in their straight counterparts); Huwiler & Remafedi, supra
note 148, at 164; Lau, supra note 122, at 333-34; Mayes, supra note 148, at 654-60;
Thomas A. Mayes, Separate Public High Schools for Sexual Minority Students and the
Limits of the Brown Analogy, 35 J.L. & Educ. 339, 342, 346 (2006) ("[E]ducating sexual
minority students in the toxic, heterosexist environments characteristic of most schools
serves to 'punish targets for transgressing norms about sex roles .... ' This violence...
marginalizes sexual minority students.., with devastating consequences, including
diminished school achievement." (footnotes omitted)); Mental Health America, Bullying in
Schools: Harassment Puts Gay Youth at Risk,
http://wwwl.nmha.org/pbedu/backtoschool/bullyingGayYouth.cfn (last visited Mar. 16,
2008).
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III. RESOLVING THE COURTS' DIVISION: CRAFTING A COMPREHENSIVE
STUDENT SPEECH STANDARD UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Crafting a comprehensive rule for student speech requires careful
consideration of the different categories of school speech and their
corresponding legal principles. Disagreement among the courts on how to
regulate antihomosexual sentiment within these categories of school speech,
however, complicates the formulation of a satisfactory standard. A
complete understanding of when schools may regulate antihomosexual
expressions cannot be achieved without first answering the questions left
lingering by the Hansen, Harper, and Nixon courts.
This Note posits that Hansen improperly applied a viewpoint neutrality
requirement under Hazelwood, and that ultimately, in accordance with the
traditional role of schools in society and the historic judicial deference paid
to the government when regulating its own speech, schools may regulate
antihomosexual speech based on the view that it expresses. This Note
further posits that Harper properly interpreted Tinker, and that schools may
regulate antihomosexual hate speech in the interest of protecting the rights
of homosexual students. Ultimately then, having resolved the
jurisprudential questions plaguing the courts, this Note advocates a
comprehensive speech standard that permits schools to regulate
antihomosexual sentiment regardless of whether it is expressed through
school-sponsored or private student mediums.
A. Constitutional Regulation ofAntihomosexual School-Sponsored
Speech Under Hazelwood
The "splintered jurisprudence"'182 on whether or not Hazelwood imposes
a viewpoint neutrality requirement on school-sponsored regulations of
speech derives from the Court's use of both nonpublic forum analysis, 183
which historically prohibits viewpoint discrimination, 184 and curricular
speech analysis, 185 which historically affords the government broad
discretion in regulating curriculum, and even license to discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint. 8 6 This section reconciles the Hazelwood Court's use of
these conflicting standards by examining the Court's traditional deference
to a school's regulation of its own speech, and the Court's own reliance on
Hazelwood as precedent in cases involving nonpublic forum analysis.
Though, in truth, the ambiguity of the Hazelwood decision cannot be
resolved absolutely without word from the Court, the best answer seems to
be that which comports with traditional conceptions of government speech
182. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. But see supra note 130.
185. See supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also Redish & Finnerty, supra note
68, at 105-06 (discussing the Hazelwood Court's broad definition of school curriculum).
186. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing traditional government
speech jurisprudence).
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and government speech in the school context. The Court's traditional and
strongly articulated endorsement of a school's broad discretion in regulating
curricular speech fits easily within traditional jurisprudence on government
speech. 187 The school's freedom to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint
makes sense in light of its function as a government entity and its historic
role as a values inculcator.188
It is hard to imagine then why a subsection of curricular speech that is
approved by the school, sponsored by the school, perceived as bearing the
imprimatur of the school, and "designed to impart particular knowledge or
skills to student[s],' 189 would be removed from the government's broad
discretion over public education and placed under a distinct set of standards
demanding viewpoint neutrality. The fact that the Court could come up
with no other classification for the speech than curricular provides little
reason to adjust its treatment from every other form of speech that the Court
has deemed curricular in the past. 190 These considerations of a school's
traditional freedom to employ viewpoint discrimination when designing
curriculum, along with the Court's silence on any additional requirement of
viewpoint neutrality, 191 weigh strongly against the Hansen court's
conclusions. 192
The Hazelwood Court's requirement that the school's editorial control
over student speech be reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical
concern 193 does little to disturb this analysis. As Professor Post has noted,
within managerial domains, the state may impose viewpoint discriminatory
limitations on speech to achieve the government's specified ends. 194 As
noted in Part I, "the state can regulate speech within public educational
institutions so as to achieve the purposes of education."' 195 The Hazelwood
Court is simply instructing the government to remain within its managerial
domain. By stepping outside of its function as an educational institution
concerned with pedagogical interests, the government would lose its
legitimacy, and consequently its discretionary privilege to engage in
viewpoint discrimination.
Unfortunately, however, this conclusion does little to address the
Hazelwood Court's application of nonpublic forum analysis. In attempting
to resolve this conflict, an examination of the Court's own use of
Hazelwood as precedent is instructive. It is telling that in Rosenberger the
Court cites Hazelwood as an example of the proposition that the viewpoint
187. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
189. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
190. Id. ("These activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum,
whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting ... .
191. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
193. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
194. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
195. Post, supra note 53, at 164; see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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neutrality requirement imposed upon the government when it facilitates
private speech in a nonpublic forum does nothing to restrict the
government's own speech, which "is controlled by different principles."' 96
This suggests that we might extend Professor Buss's argument regarding
the intersection between government speech and nonpublic forum analysis
into the category of school-sponsored speech. 197  Thus, in regulating
school-sponsored speech in a nonpublic forum, a school is not limited by a
nonpublic forum's viewpoint neutrality requirements. Examining
Hazelwood in this light allows for a coherent standard of permissible
viewpoint discrimination when the government speaks for itself, whether
that speech is uttered in the context of a traditional classroom setting, a
school-sponsored activity, or a nonpublic forum.
Interestingly, Hansen embraced this principle, but limited it to
considerations of direct government speech. In its discussion of
government speech, Hansen cited Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School
District,198 and its proposition that, when speaking for itself, the
government is not bound by public forum analysis. 199 Thus, Hansen got it
right in noting that, when speaking for itself, the government may make
viewpoint-based choices irrespective of the forum in which its speech
falls, 200 but got it wrong in assuming that Hazelwood deviated from that
standard.
Ultimately then, a school can restrict antihomosexual speech that bears
the imprimatur of the school in the interest of a legitimate pedagogical
concern. The determination of whether or not objectives such as promoting
tolerance and "provid[ing] a safe and supportive environment for gay and
lesbian students" reasonably relate to legitimate pedagogical concerns
ultimately rests within the discretion of the courts. 20 1 The extremely broad
nature of the "legitimate pedagogical concern" standard, however, appears
to leave ample room for these sorts of interests. 20 2 Indeed, in Hazelwood,
196. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995).
197. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
198. 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000). For a discussion of Downs, see supra notes 87-89
and accompanying text.
199. Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780, 793 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
200. Id. at 793.
201. Id. at 802 (citation omitted). The Hansen court's main criticism of the pedagogical
concerns asserted by Ann Arbor relied on their viewpoint discriminatory nature.
Consequently, in light of a school's right to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint when
regulating school-sponsored speech, the Hansen court's rejection of pedagogical concerns
such as promoting tolerance, and providing a supportive environment for homosexual
students, holds little predictive or substantive value.
202. See Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 925-26 (10th Cir. 2002)
(discussing the broad nature of the pedagogical interest test); see, e.g., Zamecnik v. Indian
Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204 Bd. of Educ., No. 07 C 1586, 2007 WL 1141597, at *10 (N.D. I11.
Apr. 17, 2007) (noting that "a high school's interest in promoting the tolerance of differences
among students and protecting gay students from harassment is a legitimate pedagogical
concern that permits the school to restrict speech expressing negative statements about
gays"); Morrison ex rel. v. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (holding that a
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the Court accepted the school's pedagogical interests in protecting the
privacy of students, and avoiding discussion of controversial topics such as
divorce and pregnancy that might offend the sensitivities of immature
audiences. 20 3 Considering the breadth of the pedagogical interest category,
it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a school could not frame its
reasons for limiting student speech as pertaining to a legitimate pedagogical
concern.
B. Constitutional Regulation ofAntihomosexual Student
Speech Under Tinker
Application of Tinker to instances of student speech that happen to occur
on school grounds is uncontroversial. The standard in Tinker is explicit: to
regulate pure student speech legitimately, a school must show that the
speech would cause a substantial disruption or impinge upon "the rights of
other students to be secure and to be let alone." 20 4 Controversy arises,
however, when schools extend the impingement of rights analysis beyond
its traditional framework of physical assault and fighting words to include a
distinct category of hate speech. 205 To accept such a conclusion involves
effectively reading hate speech theory into the Tinker standard.206 Relying
on the unique circumstances of the school environment, this section argues
that Tinker does protect students against verbal assaults on their identity,
and that consequently schools may permissibly regulate antihomosexual
student speech.
Conceiving of Tinker as a pure First Amendment case leaves little room
for inclusion of hate speech theory. First and foremost, the Court has yet to
adopt any such standard. 20 7 Thus, as the law stands now, there is no
indication that hate speech as a category distinct from traditional fighting
words is unprotected by the First Amendment. Further, removing hate
speech from First Amendment protection violates a clear American
tradition of protecting free speech whether or not that speech is deeply
offensive. 208
public school's diversity training video that included positive comments about homosexuals
was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical concern), rev'd on other grounds, 507
F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2007); Bitensky, supra note 63, at 818 ("[T]he phrase 'legitimate
pedagogical concerns' appears to be a euphemism for values inculcation .. "). The broad
nature of the legitimate pedagogical interest standard could, of course, be utilized to justify
school-sponsored speech in opposition to the tolerance-based messages discussed in this
Note. Thus, for example, in the interest of presenting a multifaceted view of homosexuality
and religion, the Pioneers for Christ club at Ann Arbor could have organized a similar forum
and invited speakers proclaiming that homosexuality should not be condoned.
203. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).
204. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508, 512-13 (1969);
see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 171-81 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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Tinker, however, is not a pure First Amendment case. It is, as the Tinker
court notes, an application of the First Amendment in light of the special
characteristics of a school setting.209  When considering the special
characteristics of a school environment, courts often focus on the emotional
and developmental vulnerabilities of children 210 and the corresponding
tutelary duty of schools. 211 In every Supreme Court student speech case
since Tinker, the duty of schools to protect these vulnerabilities has
outweighed the First Amendment rights of students. 212
Considering the special sensitivities of schoolchildren and the custodial
function of schools213 allows us to read Tinker as protecting more than just
a student's right to be free from physical violence. As Professor Lau has
demonstrated, children working through their own emotional and sexual
development are extremely vulnerable to the "crippling effects" of hate
speech.214 This unique vulnerability to hate speech demands that schools
limit derogatory student speech that "cause[s] young people to question
their self-worth and their rightful place in society." 215 Thus, the special
circumstances of a school environment leave educators with broad latitude
to conceive of a student's right to be "secure and to be let alone" under
Tinker in more than a physical sense. 216
While it is now clear that the rights of students under Tinker to be
"secure and to be alone" 217 may be violated by verbal attacks, the question
209. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; see Diamond, supra note 72, at 496; supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274-75 (1988)
(upholding the school principal's authority to censor sexually "frank talk" in a school
publication, partially on the basis that it was inappropriate for young audiences); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (noting that the sexual nature of a
student's speech "could well be seriously damaging to its less mature audience, many of
whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality").
211. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (upholding a school's authority
to restrict student speech advocating drug use based on the special characteristics of the
school environment and the school's interest in preventing student drug use); Hazelwood,
484 U.S. 260; Fraser, 478 U.S. 675.
213. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
214. Lau, supra note 122, at 346; supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
215. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006).
216. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). Further,
outside of the school environment and its special circumstances, children's rights are often
treated as different and more limited than those of adults. For example, children of a certain
age are not permitted to work. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 212 (2000); Id. § 213(c). Children are
tried differently in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2000). Children
may be searched in school without reasonable cause. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 340 (1985). And, children are restricted from purchasing sexually explicit materials
that an adult might buy. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Notably, in
Ginsberg the Court justified a New York law restricting a child's constitutional right to
purchase sexually explicit, though not legally obscene, materials on the grounds that parents
and teachers, "who have this primary responsibility for children's well-being," are entitled to
legal policies "designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Id. at 639.
217. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
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remains whether homophobic speech meets that standard. Medical and
sociological research supports the idea that the rights of homosexual
students are impinged upon when attending schools that permit verbal
assaults on their identity. 218 Studies directly linking peer harassment with
increased rates of depression, suicide, and substance abuse in homosexual
teenagers speak to the palpable harm inflicted upon these students. 219
Ultimately, understanding psychically violent, antihomosexual speech as
violating a student's right to be secure and let alone does nothing to disrupt
Tinker. Despite the contentions of the Nixon court, 220 there is a grave
difference between an armband protesting a political act and a T-shirt
attacking a student's sexual identity. The unique harms inflicted by unkind
expressions of intolerance and condemnation of a young person's sexual
identity justify prohibitions on antihomosexual hate speech in schools.
Consequently, the Harper court legitimately included verbal assaults on a
student's sexual identity under Tinker's "impingement of rights" limitation
on the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
In 1954, the Supreme Court boldly recognized that students who are
constantly reminded of their perceived inferiority and difference are less
willing and able to receive an adequate education. 221 Building on the
218. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. Further, a recent tragedy in a California
school has highlighted the possibility that unmitigated antihomosexual verbal assaults may
escalate into violence. In early February 2008, Lawrence King, an eighth-grade California
student, announced publicly to his classmates that he was gay. Rebecca Cathcart, Boy's
Killing, Labeled a Hate Crime, Stuns a Town, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 2008, at Al1. A few
weeks later, King was shot to death by a fellow student. Id. The prosecution is calling the
killing a hate crime, suggesting that the shooting was a response to King's sexual identity.
Id. In response to the young boy's death, a number of advocacy organizations are pushing
for "legislative review of anti-bias policies in California schools." Id. The executive director
of the Gay-Straight Alliance Network released a public statement declaring, "The tragic
death of Lawrence King is a wake-up call for our schools to better protect students from
harassment at school." Press Release, Gay-Straight Alliance Network et al., GSA Network,
Transgender Law Ctr., and EQCA Saddened over Shooting of Gay Jr. High Student in
Oxnard: Advocates Urge Stronger Bullying Prevention Efforts to Prevent Escalation of
Violence (Feb. 14, 2008), available at http://www.gsanetwork.org.
219. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. This Note does not suggest that students
should be prohibited from expressing any opinion on homosexuality. Hate speech, declaring
a student's inferiority or indignity based upon his or her sexual identity, differs drastically
from respectful dialogue and debate. As Professor Lau explains, "[C]lassroom debates over
whether homosexuality is immutable or whether same-sex marriage should be banned, while
controversial,.., do not inherently suggest that gays and lesbians should be despised and
denied respect." Lau, supra note 122, at 345. As the Harper court notes, the fact that issues
surrounding homosexuality may be politically debatable does not give students license to
"assault[] their fellow students with demeaning statements[] by calling gay students
shameful." Harper, 445 F.3d at 1181.
220. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
221. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn." (citing the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas's
opinion)).
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Brown legacy, modem public schools must be sensitive to the messages of
inferiority resonating in their classrooms, on their auditorium stages, and
within their crowded hallways. T-shirts and public proclamations of the
sinfulness and deviance of homosexuality leave gay students wondering if
their classmates are right about their inhumanity, immutable difference, and
eternal damnation. 222 It is the responsibility of public schools to regulate
these messages in order to protect the rights of homosexual students, and to
provide all students with equal access to a safe and supportive educational
environment. This Note posits that schools may pursue these goals under a
legal standard of speech that permits the regulation of antihomosexual
messages whether they are delivered through curricular, school-sponsored,
or private student mediums.
A public school's power to limit antihomosexual speech is well grounded
in Supreme Court case law. A thorough reading of First Amendment
jurisprudence in light of the traditional discretion of schools to inculcate
fundamental values, and create a learning environment sensitive to the
unique vulnerabilities of schoolchildren, reveals a clear standard. When
antihomosexual speech may reasonably be classified as bearing the
imprimatur of the school, it falls under Hazelwood and may be regulated,
provided that the school can reasonably relate its speech restriction to a
legitimate pedagogical concern. When antihomosexual speech is offered by
a student and does not bear the imprimatur of the school, it falls under
Tinker and may be regulated in the interest of protecting the rights of
homosexual students to be secure and let alone. Although such speech
restrictions would not be constitutional outside of schools, they are
consistent with the Court's historic deference to school administrators who
must balance a student's freedom of expression against the physical and
psychological vulnerabilities of other children.
This Note does not argue in favor of muting student debate on political
and social issues relating to homosexuality. Rather, it advocates a
comprehensive speech standard that permits schools to limit various forms
of expression that attack and degrade the sexual identity of homosexual
students. Under this standard, the poster board signs at Mira Loma High
School declaring the shamefulness of homosexuality may be banned by the
school whether they are used for a classroom lesson, a school-sponsored
forum, or a student protest.22 3
The line dividing when public schools may and may not regulate student
expression regarding homosexuality is personified in the experience of a
Mira Loma High School student who witnessed the protests discussed in the
222. Reis, supra note 181, at 13. Reis quotes a homosexual student as stating that
"[incidents of harassment] make[] me feel that I'm less human than everybody else and
make[] me wonder if I am a freak or not, and if I die will I go to hell? So many fears
running through my head it's pitiful." Id.




Introduction. Hassan Shabazz, when attending high school in Sacramento,
openly expressed his moral opposition to the homosexual lifestyle. In mid-
April 2006, Shabazz even attended a school board meeting and spoke out
against what he perceived to be his school's progay standpoint. 224 But on
April 26, 2006, when Shabazz showed up for school and was offered an
antihomosexual T-shirt, he refused to put it on.225 Only seventeen years
old, Shabazz was able to recognize the difference between diversity and
division, between opposition and persecution, between debate and
disrespect. It is the difference between a Harper T-shirt and a Tinker
armband. It is the difference between when a school may abridge a
student's First Amendment right to express offensive viewpoints and when
it may not.
224. Deepa Ranganathan, Tone Eases on Gay Debate, Sacramento Bee, April 28, 2006, at
B1.
225. Id. (quoting Hassan Shabazz as responding to the antigay protesters by declaring,
"We're supposed to be serving a God of love, and you're persecuting people and making
enemies").
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